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Abstract
The increasing availability of rich (panel) data provides many opportunities to test 
theories on consumption smoothing behaviour. At the same time, the informational 
requirements in terms of data and modelling are high and very context specific, thus 
requiring a filtering of essential explanatory ingredients. In this paper we show how 
conceptual and exploratory empirical analysis can contribute to this filtering process. We 
develop a conceptual framework to analyze possible smoothing arrangements of 
households distinguishing between various smoothing mechanisms, institutional 
smoothing partners and required assets. Subsequently, we apply this framework to 
Russian survey data to explore how Russian households may smooth consumption. We 
select and analyze a broad set of indicators from household survey data to study what 
actions Russian households take and how these actions reflect the existence and 
prevalence of particular smoothing channels. The results can be used to formulate 
hypotheses on household smoothing behaviour and to delineate the features of a more 
rigorous analysis. The picture that emerges is one in which financial markets play a 
limited role as a smoothing channel in Russia, regardless of the smoothing mechanism 
used (saving, lending, insurance). Instead, households seem to use internal strategies, 
their family, social networks and the state to smooth consumption through capital 
accumulation, gift giving, the provision of loans and (pension) benefits. Furthermore, we 
find some evidence that old age pensions may be used for intergenerational risk-sharing 
within families while other findings point towards the use of household food production 
as an income smoothing strategy as opposed to a shock-response strategy. 
Keywords: consumption smoothing, poverty, social risk management, Russia 
JEL: D12, D13, D31, H53, H55
1. Introduction
Households face the risk that they are not able to fulfil the (basic) needs of their 
members, today as well as tomorrow. To prevent this risk from materializing, households 
set aside part of their current resources to finance future consumption in the form of 
savings or insurance. Additionally, when it becomes clear that income will not suffice, 
households can seek alternative funding. When these measures are effective, households 
are able to maintain a particular welfare level, even when (expected) income falls short. 
The ability of households to smooth consumption over time thus reflects a key dimension 
of well being. Although the underlying smoothing mechanisms are similar, the ways in 
which households smooth consumption are highly context dependent, i.e. on the 
particular institutional, social and economic context they live in.
Households in transition economies face a wide range of risks and shocks similar to those 
experienced by households all over the world.1 At the same time, the drastic structural 
changes taking place in transition economies form an additional source of risk; the 
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy has been accompanied by 
macro-economic instability such as high inflation, real wage declines, unemployment, 
financial and economic crises thereby shaping a highly uncertain environment for 
households in transition economies. In spite of this, Russian households are able to 
partially smooth consumption when they are hit by such shocks (Notten & Crombrugghe 
de, 2006; Skoufias, 2003). But how do these households smooth consumption? Strategies 
that worked during Soviet times may or may not work anymore while the changing 
structures in the economy may provide new, perhaps market-based, smoothing 
opportunities. In this paper, we want to explore how Russian households smooth 
consumption. 
To guide our analysis we propose a conceptual framework to analyze households’ 
consumption smoothing strategies. Central in this framework is a typology of 
consumption smoothing strategies which is based on what actions households may take to 
                                                
1 These are for instance shocks such as natural disasters, crime, illness, disability or death of a household 
member and job loss.
smooth consumption. Then, we relate these smoothing strategies to possible institutional 
smoothing partners and the assets that may be required to follow a particular smoothing 
strategy. We apply this framework to Russia and empirically explore rich survey data to 
find out what Russian household do at a given point in time and how these actions may 
contribute to consumption smoothing. We focus on the 2003 survey to analyze a broad 
range of indicators on smoothing actions. We also investigate whether the observed 
patterns differ by levels of wealth and rural or urban areas. 
By focusing on the household as the central institution to manage risks, the conceptual 
framework offers an alternative way to analyze and interpret existing survey data without 
a priori restricting the scope of the analysis to a particular smoothing mechanism or 
smoothing channel. The results can be used to formulate hypotheses on household 
smoothing behaviour and to delineate the features of an analysis beyond the exploration 
offered in this paper; it provides information about which smoothing channels are worth 
further investigating and which linkages have to be taken into account in a 
country/community (or not). Moreover, the conceptual framework guides thinking about 
the role, scope and type of government interventions and possible feedback effects to 
other smoothing channels. 
This paper is structured as follows; in section 0 we set out our conceptual framework and 
in section 0 we explain the selection and characteristics of the household sample from the 
Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) and point out in what way the range of 
selected smoothing indicators are linked to the conceptual framework. Section 0 analyses 
the smoothing indicators; it sketches a picture of how Russian households smooth 
consumption, using which smoothing channels. Section 0 concludes with a summary of 
the main findings and hypotheses and discusses the relevance of followed research 
approach. 
2. Conceptual framework
Being able to smooth consumption reflects an important dimension of well-being as it 
reflects people’s capacity to satisfy their (basic) needs today as well as tomorrow, despite 
the existence of risks and the occurrence of shocks. Studies analyzing the relation 
between income and consumption show that, over time, household consumption is 
considerably smoother than income; a reduction (increase) in household income is not 
accompanied by a similarly large decline (increase) in consumption. Although there is 
considerable evidence that consumption smoothing takes place in both developed and 
developing countries, the economic literature also shows that the actual smoothing 
mechanisms employed can be very context specific, especially in developing economies.2
Mechanisms that work for one group, country or region do not work for others or are not 
accessible. Moreover, households may use various smoothing mechanisms that 
complement each other. It is important to better understand how households smooth 
consumption, not only for academic purposes but also for governments that wish to 
improve the capacities of their citizens to manage risks. 
In this section we develop a conceptual framework which guides the exploration of 
potential smoothing mechanisms but that does not restrict the particular forms they may 
take in various environments. Central in the framework is a typology of consumption 
smoothing strategies, with each strategy depicting a different smoothing mechanism. 
Subsequently, we define a range of institutional counterparts and assets that can be used 
to follow a particular smoothing strategy. The combination of a smoothing strategy, 
institutional counterpart and required assets reflects a specific smoothing channel. We 
take the perspective of the household as point of departure as the household reflects the 
first risk sharing level for individuals in many societies, including our case-study Russia. 
                                                
2 The economic literature typically analyzes consumption smoothing behaviour following two approaches; 
the first approach models household behaviour using a permanent income model or risk-sharing model and 
focuses on the overall smoothness of consumption vis-à-vis income flows (see (Deaton, 1992) for an 
overview). The second approach models and tests particular consumption smoothing mechanisms for 
specific groups of households or regions (Alessi & Lusardi, 1997; Dercon, 1998; Dubois, Jullien, & 
Magnac, December 2006; Hoogeveen, 2001; Kochar, 2004; Ligon, 1998; Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig 
& Wolpin, 1993; Udry, 1994, 1995).
Table 1: Typology of consumption smoothing strategies
Strategies Consumption smoothing mechanism




Financial savings finance future consumption.
Accumulation of 
physical capital
Physical assets can be sold to finance consumption but they also 
contribute current consumption and/or can be used as physical collateral 
for a loan or credit.
Seek insurance Insurance mitigates the impact of shocks by providing resources to 
finance consumption when a particular contingency occurs.




Generate additional income to finance consumption
Seek loans or credit Loans or credits finance consumption.
Seek transfers Transfers finance consumption.
The analysis assumes a one generation – one period world. In this world, wealth is not 
accumulated across generations; any existing wealth has been accumulated by the 
household itself. Each household has to produce for itself, exchange its home production 
for goods (or money) or sell its labour on a labour market (or a combination of all of 
this). In this world, households face the risk of not being able to cover their basic needs. 
In order to reduce the impact of this risk, households may follow a combination of 
different consumption smoothing strategies (Table 1). We distinguish six strategies or 
actions that can be grouped under two broader categories; ex ante strategies and ex post
strategies. Each strategy reflects a distinct smoothing mechanism. The ex ante or 
mitigating strategies create alternative funding sources in case future income falls short of 
what is expected. These strategies imply that part of current income is reserved for future 
contingencies. We distinguish between financial and physical capital accumulation 
because physical capital may additionally contribute to current consumption (if durable) 
and can also function as collateral for using other smoothing mechanisms (i.e. getting a 
loan). Insurance, on the other hand, only provides funding when a particular contingency 
materializes. The ex post or coping strategies are employed to create alternative funding 
sources after it becomes clear that current income is not sufficient to satisfy basic needs. 
We distinguish three different mechanisms; additional income generating activities (i.e. 
increase labour supply, home production or the selling of home produced goods), seeking 
credit/loans or seeking transfers. 
To follow a particular consumption smoothing strategy, households may use different 
institutions. Take for instance the borrowing strategy; households can borrow funds from 
financials institutions, informal money lenders, family and friends or by buying products 
on credit. A particularly useful concept for thinking about consumption smoothing 
strategies and the possible smoothing partners of households is the Welfare Pentagon (C. 
Neubourg de, 2002). The Welfare Pentagon represents the five core institutions that 
households may use to satisfy current and future needs in a given society: family, 
markets, social networks, membership institutions and public authorities (Figure 1).3
Even though historical and geographical appearances differ, these institutions are found 
in all societies across time and locations. The relevance of each institution and the 
exchange relations between households and these institutions may differ by society.
Households use these institutions to generate income but also to smooth consumption; 
labour markets, product markets and capital markets allow households to trade and 
exchange in order to secure resources to satisfy the main needs at a certain moment. On 
the labour market households exchange effort against a (future) wage; on product markets 
households trade effort against a (future) profit; on the capital market households trade 
income against future income by investments, savings, insurances, borrowings and the 
like. Families, social networks and membership institutions address the risk of not being 
able to satisfy basic needs by means of various (and different) mechanisms of solidarity. 
Membership institutions are institutions of which individuals can become a member and 
from which they can resign. Examples of such institutions are unions, mutual insurance 
companies, co-operatives, neighbourhood associations or saving and credit societies. 
                                                
3 The Welfare Pentagon is a central and distinctive element in the 'Social Risk Management' approach as 
developed by Chris de Neubourg (C. Neubourg de, 2002; C.  Neubourg de & Weigand, 2000). The Social 
Risk Management framework is formulated to analyze the role and scope of public interventions and 
foremost, but not exclusively, that of public social protection policies. Although there are some differences, 
the Social Protection Unit of the World Bank uses a similar framework (Holzman & Jorgensen, February 
2000). The innovative aspect of both approaches is that it provides both a rationale for, as well as a tool to 
think about ex post and ex ante public measures to deal with risks in society.  
Public authorities can assist households directly by means of public social protection 
(pension schemes, child benefits, unemployment insurance) but also indirectly by 
enforcing contracts through a judicial system, introducing legislation aimed at correcting 
market failures (such as minimum reserve requirements for banks). However, the 
household can also internalize income generating activities and consumption smoothing 
by self-sufficient home production, accumulating physical assets or holding cash savings. 
Figure 1: Welfare Pentagon
Source: (C. Neubourg de, 2002)
In addition to time or effort, following a specific consumption smoothing strategy 
typically also requires some kind of asset. Assets can be financial (cash, money on a bank 
account, stocks), physical (land, house, machines, jewellery), human (education, skills), 
social (family ties, acquaintances) or collective (citizenship, contribution record). 
Combining the typology of consumption smoothing strategies in Table 1 with the 
institutions in the Welfare pentagon and the notion that each consumption-smoothing 
channel requires some kind of input or investment, we obtain the possible consumption 
smoothing channels as sketched in 
Table 2. For instance, households can buy an insurance against certain risks on financial 
markets using part of their financial assets to pay the insurance premium. Alternatively, 
households can be insured for certain risks by public authorities through paying taxes or 
social insurance contributions or simply because they are a citizen. On the other hand, 
they can rely on social networks or family to compensate them after a shock occurs. 
Depending on the characteristics of these arrangements a social input is required (promise 
of reciprocity, ‘good’ reputation or family relation). Alternatively, households can also 
adjust their income generating activities i.e. supply more labour, sell more home 
produced goods and increase home production. 
We further assume that households differ in their capacities to produce wealth, in their 
exposure to risks which endanger the production of wealth and in their degree of risk 
aversion. Together with the initial wealth distribution, these factors result in households 
adopting different income generating and consumption smoothing strategies. The 
differences in the economic activities of households lead to an income distribution and a 
corresponding consumption distribution. In that distribution, some households are poor in 
the sense that they have not enough wealth to satisfy their basic needs (according to a 
pre-set poverty definition). More importantly, differences in the place households take in 
the income distribution will lead to behavioural differences in terms of consumption 
smoothing strategies. This will change their place in the income distribution, or 
alternatively, reinforce it.   
Depending on the community or country, some smoothing channels may be more 
prevalent than others. It is also possible that several institutions are active in providing 
assistance with the same type of consumption smoothing. This may be because a part of 
the population does not have access to a particular consumption smoothing channel 
because it lacks the required assets to establish an exchange relationship with an 
institutional counterpart. For instance, in the microfinance literature the inability of low  
Table 2: Consumption smoothing channels
Strategies/Actions Institutional 
counterpart
Assets needed by household
Ex ante – create alternative source of funding in case future income falls short
(mitigating strategies)






Financial assets (liquid assets)




Financial assets (liquid assets) 
Seek insurance Market (financial)







Financial assets (insurance policy), 
social assets (reputation, relations), 
collective assets (citizenship, contribution 
history / rights) or membership (i.e. trade 
union)
Ex post – create alternative funding sources when current income is insufficient
(coping strategies)





Labour, productive assets, 
financial assets (working capital)
Seek loans or credit Market (financial)





Physical assets (collateral), social assets 
(reputation, relations)





Social assets (reputation, relations), collective 
assets (citizenship, rights)
wealth entrepreneurs to obtain credits from formal financial markets is partly explained 
by the lack of ownership of a physical asset that can serve as collateral for the credit.
Instead, this person may obtain a loan through his social network where reputation, 
kinship or social pressure may function as some kind of ‘social’ collateral.
The above framework helps to analyze consumption smoothing behaviour because it 
provides a general framework of thought which encompasses most, if not all, potential 
consumption smoothing strategies of households in a society. In the next part, we use this 
framework to formulate and classify a wide range of indicators of consumption 
smoothing channels in Russia. There are, however, a number of aspects that the 
conceptual framework does not directly address. Firstly, by taking the household level as 
the unit of analysis and a one period analysis, we abstract from household formation as 
the ultimate consumption smoothing strategy of individuals but it also implies that we do 
not analyze the role of human capital investment.4
Secondly, the framework categorizes a range of actions as potential consumption 
smoothing strategies but it does not indicate which strategy would be preferable on what 
grounds. One concern in the development literature is that some households smooth 
consumption using less efficient and effective channels and are thereby unable to 
improve their lives (Dercon, 1998; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1989; Rosenzweig, 1988; 
Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993; Zimmerman & Carter, 2003). Due to a combination of risk 
aversion and low wealth, households are not willing to take actions which increase the 
probability that their consumption will ever fall below a certain minimum level. This 
‘disaster management’ leads to different asset accumulation strategies for low and high 
wealth households, where the latter group is more successful in improving their welfare 
in the long term. Lack of access or failure of certain consumption smoothing channels, 
are additional reasons for the existence of a poverty trap. Whether a particular smoothing 
channel is welfare improving or not, is highly context dependent. In Western Tanzania 
high wealth farmers accumulate cattle while low wealth farmers engage in low risk-return 
off farm activities (Dercon, 1998) while in Georgia non-farm activities are seen as a way 
out of poverty (Kobaladze, November 2002). Alternatively, in Burkina Faso low wealth 
                                                
4 The occurrence of shocks, a rise in uncertainty or the availability of consumption smoothing channels may 
affect households’ living arrangements or fertility decisions.
individuals invest relative more in buffer assets (grain) than in productive assets 
(land)(Zimmerman & Carter, 2003). While the farmers in Tanzania and Burkina Faso can 
choose to follow either strategy, the rural inhabitants of Georgia indicate that there is no 
opportunity to engage in non-farm activities. Given this context specificity, we do not 
attempt to specify a priori a preference ranking of smoothing strategies or channels.5  
Finally, certain smoothing channels may be more suited to help manage particular types 
of shocks or risks than other channels. Some consumption smoothing channels are 
relatively successful to deal with shocks arising from idiosyncratic risks, but fail when 
there is an aggregate or covariant shock such as an economic crisis or a natural disaster 
(Hoogeveen, 2001; McKenzie, 2003; Skoufias, 2003; Udry, 1994). Moreover, if a 
household perceives that it is vulnerable to a particular kind of risk, it will adjust its 
consumption smoothing strategies accordingly. For instance, Indian households with a 
higher risk of illness or bad health choose to accumulate more liquid and fewer 
productive assets (Kochar, 2004) and wage arrears induce Russian households who are 
more vulnerable to that risk to save more (Guariglia & Kim, 2003). A possible extension 
of the framework could encompass the inclusion of various types of risks.  
3. Data and methodology
Previous research has shown that Russian households have been capable of partially 
smoothing their consumption despite suffering from many income shocks during the 
transition period (Notten & Crombrugghe de, 2006; Skoufias, 2003). The objective of our 
empirical analysis is to get an impression of how Russian households currently smooth 
consumption after more than a decade of structural change. We use the conceptual 
framework developed in the previous section to select indicators of possible smoothing 
channels from rich survey data. Subsequently, we explore the prevalence and differential 
use of consumption smoothing channels by Russian households at a given point in time
                                                
5 In the empirical analysis we also decompose the indicators according to permanent consumption quintiles 
and test whether there are significant differences in the use of particular channels between these quintiles.
(2003).6 We restrict our focus to a single year because we want to study indicators for a 
wide range of smoothing channels. The resulting analysis is interesting because the 
conceptual framework guides the use of typical household survey data to create a broad 
and novel household perspective on the use of consumption smoothing channels. This 
broad perspective is important because a household most likely uses a range of smoothing 
channels at the same time and the use of smoothing channels can differ with household 
characteristics. The results can be used to formulate hypotheses about consumption 
smoothing behaviour and to indicate areas (or institutions) in which government 
intervention is needed to enhance households' risk management. However, more rigorous 
analysis is needed to prove whether the identified channels indeed have a smoothing 
function, to what extent and how they help households to smooth consumption, and how 
government intervention can enhance the functioning of a given channel.7  
We use the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) to analyze the prevalence 
of consumption smoothing channels used by Russian households.8 The sample includes 
all households that have been observed annually in the RLMS from 2000 to 2003; this 
balanced panel consists of about 2,700 households. We selected a panel, because we also 
want to study differences in the use of smoothing channels for different levels of wealth.9
10 As explained before, depending on the level of wealth, households may follow 
different smoothing strategies using different channels. To approximate the wealth of a 
                                                
6 After the 1998 financial and economic crisis Russia experienced a period of sustained economic recovery 
combined with ongoing structural reforms. Smoothing behaviour of households in times of large aggregate 
shocks (and the outcome in terms of consumption smoothness) can be very different from behaviour in 
more stable periods (Hoogeveen, 2001; McKenzie, 2003; Skoufias, 2003; Udry, 1994). 
7 Such analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
8 Detailed information on the RLMS project is provided on the following website:  
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/home.html.
9 The RLMS does not have post-stratification weights for its panel dimension. In Gassmann and Notten 
(2006) we compare the characteristics of the cross-sections with the five year balanced panel (2000-2004) 
and find a number of differences. Urban households (especially from Moscow and St Petersburg), are 
underrepresented in the panel. Households with children are somewhat overrepresented while there are 
fewer single person households in the panel sample. Average income and expenditures are somewhat lower 
in the panel. Despite the level effects (i.e. poverty rates are somewhat higher in the panel) we find that both 
samples reflect the same trends (time) and similar differences between subgroups of the population (rural-
urban and by expenditures). This is in line with the findings of an earlier attrition study of the RLMS by 
Heeringa (1997).
10 Differences in means between urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles are statistically tested using 
a Wald test in which we control for clusters in the sampling design of the RLMS.  
household we average annual equivalent household expenditures over the period 2000 to 
2003 and divide the resulting distribution in quintiles. Equivalent expenditures are 
obtained by dividing household's expenditures by its household specific poverty line.11
The resulting values thus reflect the average distance of a household’s living standard 
relative to its absolute poverty line; a value below 1 indicates that a household, on 
average, lived in poverty during the period 2000-2003 and vice versa for an average 
above 1. 
Table 3: Average equivalent expenditure distribution (2000-2003)1
Characteristics Equivalent expenditures
(relative to poverty line)
Average 2.93
Median 2.35
Ratio at 5% of distribution 0.83
Ratio at 95% of distribution 6.80
Standard deviation 2.44






Note: 1 We obtained the distribution as follows. First, we divided households' annual expenditures by its 
household specific poverty line to adjust for demographic differences between households and differences 
between regional price levels. Subsequently, we averaged households' equivalent annual expenditures over 
the period 2000-2003. Finally, we divided the resulting household distribution in 5 equally sized quantiles.
Source: Own calculations RLMS
Table 3 lists some characteristics of this distribution. Clearly, the distribution is very 
dense at low expenditure levels; only the fifth quintile has considerably higher 
expenditures (on average more than six times the value of the poverty line). Quite a 
number of households were living in the vicinity of the absolute poverty line from 2000-
2003; average expenditures in the lowest quintile are about 1 and that of the second 
quintile is 1.7.12 The group of households in the lowest quintile can be considered as 
chronically poor according to a common definition of chronic poverty (having average 
                                                
11 We use the absolute poverty lines provided in the RLMS data. These household specific poverty lines are 
adjusted for the size and composition of the household and valued at regional price levels. We further use 
the expenditure and income variables as constructed by the RLMS which include the value of home 
produced (and consumed) goods (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/home.html).
12 Especially in countries with high (expenditure) inequality such as Russia, poverty statistics are very 
sensitive to the level of the poverty line. The RLMS poverty line is on average about 2/3 of the value of the 
(official) Minimum Subsistence Level of the Russian Federation (Notten & Gassmann, 2006).
expenditures below the poverty line over a given period). But with a somewhat higher 
subsistence level, that label could even be applied to many households in the second 
quintile. Table 4 further summarizes characteristics of the households for the whole 
sample, by rural13 and urban settlement area and by average expenditure quintiles.  A 
large part of Russian households live in urban areas (62%) and those households are more 
likely to be found in the higher regions of the average expenditure distribution.
  
Table 4: Characteristics of household panel (2000-2003) in 2003 
Even though the multi-purpose RLMS survey contains a wealth of information, it is not 
designed or structured specifically to analyze consumption smoothing behaviour and thus 
only allows us to analyze a limited part of the puzzle. On the other hand, it also allows us 
to identify which pieces of the puzzle are missing. Using the conceptual framework as a 
guide, we selected a range of smoothing indicators from the 2003 RLMS questionnaires 
(Table 5). Some of the selected variables function as indicators for a particular 
                                                
13 We included households living in semi-urban settlement areas in the rural group because this group is too 
small too analyze separately and appears to be more similar to rural households.  
Average expenditure quintiles 
Total Urban Rural 1 2 3 4 5
# of observations 2,718 1,690 1,028 544 544 543 544 544
Share population (%) 100 62.3 37.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Urban area (%) 62.3 100 0 51.1 57.4 64.8 69.7 67.8
Household size (%)
1 19.9 21.3 17.5 15.6 18.0 16.9 23.4 25.4
2 28.7 30.2 26.2 24.8 22.1 30.9 32.0 33.7
3 24.3 26.0 21.5 26.8 26.1 24.5 21.7 22.5
4 16.7 15.8 18.2 16.5 22.1 17.3 14.9 12.7
>4 10.4 6.4 16.6 16.2 11.7 10.3 8.1 5.7
Household types (%)
Single adult 3.6 4.1 2.8 5.0 2.9 2.0 3.5 4.8
Single elderly 16.2 17.1 14.7 10.7 14.9 14.9 19.9 20.6
Adult couple 7.8 8.2 7.0 8.5 5.0 9.6 6.4 9.4
Elderly couple 9.9 10.0 9.8 4.4 7.2 9.0 14.2 14.9
Single caretaker with children 4.6 5.4 3.4 6.6 4.0 5.3 3.5 3.7
Adults with children 21.1 22.0 19.7 20.8 24.1 19.7 20.0 20.8
Extended family 9.0 7.3 11.9 10.7 12.1 9.0 7.2 6.1
Elderly and adults, no 
children
11.7 10.9 13.0 12.9 12.0 12.9 12.5 8.3
Other households 16.0 15.0 17.7 20.6 17.8 17.5 12.9 11.4
Average income1 7,465 7,868 6,801 4,406 5,920 7,425 7,900 11,682
Average expenditures1 8,711 9,098 8,074 3,390 5,383 7,188 8,981 18,626
Note: 1 Expressed in June 1992 ruble and household averages
Source: Own calculations RLMS
consumption smoothing strategy that is followed, but do not provide sufficient 
information about the institutional counterpart or the required assets. For instance, as 
indicators for the ‘seek loans or credit’ strategy we use a set of variables indicating 
whether a household has debt and whether it made loan repayments but we do not know 
which institution provided the loan. Similarly, we know about a range of physical assets 
owned by a household but we do not know whether any of these were used as collateral 
for obtaining the loan. However, for many indicators we can identify the institutional 
counterpart or at least argue which institution is the most likely the counterpart. When a 
household mentions it provided a loan or reported having received repayments from 
loans, we know that this household is involved in the provision of loans, most likely to 
other households. Or alternatively, if a household reported having saved money for 
interest it is likely to have saved using a financial market institution. Finally, the RLMS 
contains quite a lot of information on the giving and receipt of gifts but the information is 
insufficient to classify particular gifts either as insurance or transfer seeking strategies. As 
can be seen in Table 5, there are indicators for every smoothing strategy and in many 
cases part of the consumption smoothing channel can also be identified. We also included
an indicator for the consumption smoothing ability of households indicating the self-
estimated survival period of the household in case it would lose all sources of income. 
In our conceptual framework we distinguish between income generating activities and 
consumption smoothing activities but we also include the adjustment of income 
generating activities as one of the ex post coping strategies. The 2003 RLMS 
questionnaires did not include any specific shock response questions, which makes it 
difficult to distinguish between normal income generating activities and post shock 
adjustments in those activities. Given this difficulty, we also included a range of 
indicators on income generating activities (Table 6) in addition to the shock adjustment 
indicators (Table 5). As indicators for post-shock adjustments we constructed a variable 
Table 5: Indicators of consumption smoothing channels in the RLMS 
Institution Indicator
Accumulation of financial capital
- Having saved (last month)
Financial market - Has saving on interest bearing account
- Has bought (or derived income from) stocks and/or bonds (last 
month)
Accumulation of physical capital
Household - Asset ownership: owns house, land, durables
- Income from (sale of) assets: rents property, sold property,  sold 
jewellery, currency or depleting savings (last month)
Seek insurance
Financial market - Income from insurance payments (last month)
- Expenditures on premiums (last month)
Public authorities (social 
security)
- Incidence of social security type and income share of benefits such 
as pensions and unemployment benefits
- Pension rights (private and/or federal fund)
Social networks / family - Gift giving/receiving (yes/no, amounts, income share and to/from 
who(m)) (last month)
Adjust income generating activities
Labour market / goods 
market
- Having a 2nd or 3rd job
- Having an informal job
Seek loans or credit 
- Has debt (yes/no, expenditure share)
- Made loan repayments (last month)
Social networks / family - Loans provided by households (last month)
- Net lending (last month)
Labour market - Access to loans from employer (yes/no)
Goods market - Has unpaid utility bills (yes/no, real value)
Seek transfers
Public authorities (social 
assistance)
- Incidence of social assistance type and income share of benefits 
such as child benefits and housing benefits
Social networks / family - Gift giving/receiving (yes/no, amounts, income share and to/from 
who(m)) (last month)
Overall ability of consumption smoothing 
Household - self-reported survival time in case a household looses all income 
sources
Note: All indicators are analyzed at a household level. Those indicators originating from individual 
questionnaires have been summarized at the household level. For instance, if an adult mentioned he/she had 
a second job, a household level variable was created indicating that at least one household member had a 
second job.
indicating whether at least one household member had a second or third job and similarly 
for having an informal job. These variables can be interpreted as second-best responses to 
unemployment, underemployment and other problems with income generating activities 
(wage arrears, forced leave, non-cash wage payments, unsuccessful home production 
etc.). As these activities also include informal entrepreneurial activities (providing 
services, selling home produced foodstuffs) the institutional counterparts can be labour 
and goods markets. Table 6 displays a range of income generating activities 
distinguishing between home production, labour supply and entrepreneurial activities. We 
further discuss the interpretation and limitations of the indicators in the next section.




- Required asset: ownership land / other land use arrangements
- Land use / growing crops / having livestock / gathered nut/mushrooms, 
fished etc (last year)
- Monetary value of home production (total, by activity, 
amount consumed) (monthly value)
Labour market - Employment (last month), having wage income and share of
 wage income (last month)
- Having wage earnings (yes/no, share of total income) 
- Problems: unemployment, payment arrears, non-cash wage, concern for 
loss of job and certainty of finding a new one
Goods market - Having an ‘entrepreneurial job’ 
- Ever started a business (yes/no, success/failure)
- Monetary value of home production sold (total, by activity, 
(monthly value)
Note: All indicators are analyzed at a household level. Those indicators originating from individual 
questionnaires have been summarized at the household level. For instance, if an adult mentioned he/she had 
a second job, a household level variable was created indicating that at least one household member had a 
second job.
4. Consumption smoothing in Russia: what do Russian households do?
What do households in Russia do to ensure that they have sufficient resources to finance 
their (basic) needs today as well as tomorrow? The conceptual framework developed in 
this paper identifies a wide range of possible strategies, institutional counterparts and 
required assets and we have selected a considerable group of indicators for some of these 
possibilities. We now analyze and interpret the descriptive results and simple significance 
tests with the aim to sketch a picture of which consumption smoothing channels Russian 
households may use or not. We also briefly analyze indicators of household's income 
smoothing activities because we the adjustment of income generating activities is also 
included as a consumption smoothing strategy. This resulting picture is not complete (by 
far) and alternative interpretations that are also consistent with the observed results can 
certainly be formulated. Despite these limitations, this exercise is valuable because it 
gives an indication of the prevalence of certain consumption smoothing channels as well 
as the differential use of these channels by various groups of households (we distinguish 
between wealth quintiles and rural/urban settlement area). A particular interest for the 
context of Russia is to explore the extent to which households use markets to smooth 
consumption. Thus, the output of this paper does not consist of proving the existence, 
functioning and motivations for these consumption smoothing channels but it yields 
interesting and relevant hypotheses on how households smooth consumption in Russia. 
Testing these hypotheses requires more theoretical and empirical work and we discuss 
some of these options for further research. 
This section first discusses households' perceptions on their smoothing abilities, followed 
by the analysis of the indicators for ex ante and ex post consumption smoothing 
strategies, and is concluded by viewing some indicators on income generating activities. 
4.1 Perceived ability of consumption smoothing
We start with an impression of households’ self-estimated consumption smoothing 
abilities (Table 7). The respondent of the household questionnaire was asked to estimate 
the period that the household could survive without income; 83% of the Russian 
households expect they could only survive less than a month if they would lose all 
income sources. The results of the Wald test suggest that households in rural areas and 
households in higher average expenditure quintiles estimate having longer periods of 
survival without income. We will discuss below that these two groups of households are 
likely to use different smoothing mechanisms and channels. The case that was sketched 
to the respondents is extreme but it nevertheless shows that, unless alternative income 
sources are found, the time horizon of consumption smoothing opportunities for Russian 
households is limited to months rather than years.14
                                                
14 In Notten and de Combrugghe (2006) we incorporate this temporary ability of consumption smoothing 
into a model of consumption smoothing by distinguishing between short and long term relationships; while 
allowing for short term deviations between income and consumption, the model stipulated a balanced long 
term relation between those variables. 
4.2 Ex ante consumption smoothing strategies: asset accumulation and insurance
After a decade of severe macro-economic instability, the new millennium brought Russia 
a period of stable growth which was also transmitted into sustained improvements in 
living standards. The poverty rate, peaking at 34% in 1998, declined strongly to 12% in 
2003 (Notten & Crombrugghe de, 2006). As noted in Table 4, household income and 
consumption increased considerably during this period. In such good times, it makes 
sense to use part of this extra income to re-build capital stocks or to arrange insurance. 
We look for evidence of these strategies and their corresponding channels using a 
snapshot of this period (4th quarter 2003). Table 8 to Table 12 display the results for the 
indicators of ex ante smoothing channels.  
Surprisingly however, only 13% of Russian households reported to have saved any 
money in the month prior to the survey (Table 8). There is virtually no investment in 
more sophisticated financial products such as stocks and shares; few households report 
buying such products or receive income from them. The percentage of saving households 
is higher in urban areas and increases as average expenditures increase; 4% of the 
households in the lowest quintile save as compared to 18% in the 4th and 5th quintiles. 
Unfortunately, the information on savings does not unambiguously reveal whether 
households save using financial markets or store cash in their homes. However, few 
households get interest payments for their savings (less than 3%) which suggests that still 
a large part of household savings are in cash and may be deposited under the mattress 
instead of on a bank account. Buying an insurance product from a financial market 
institute is also not very popular; less than 5% of the households report to have spent 
Table 7: Self-perceived ability of consumption smoothing
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
How long can the household survive if all income is lost?
More than 6 months 4.2 2.6 6.9 2.0 2.7 2.5 4.4 9.4
A few months 13.2 11.7 15.7 8.5 10.4 14.9 15.3 16.9
Less than a month 27.2 25.6 29.9 21.3 30.5 28.4 27.1 28.4
Less than 2 weeks 12.8 13.7 11.3 11.9 11.3 15.4 13.0 12.5
Less than 1 week 26.5 28.8 22.5 31.4 29.9 24.9 24.4 21.9




24.9 15.2 13.9 15.8 10.9
.01
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 
Source: Own calculations RLMS
Table 8: Accumulation of financial capital – Financial market / Household
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
Has savings 2,718 12.6 14.1.1 10.1 .1 4.2.01 9.6 12.9 18.2 18.2 .01
- with interest payments 1,914 2.8 3.5 1.9 ns 0.7 3.1 3.0 2.3 3.3 ns
Bought bonds/shares 2,718 0.1 0.2 0 ns 0 0 0 0.6 0 ns
Received payments from 
bonds/shares 
2,718 1.1 1.4 0.6 ns 0.6.1 0.7 0.4 1.5 2.2 .1
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 
Source: Own calculations RLMS
Table 9: Accumulation of physical capital - Household
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
Household derives income from physical assets 
Property sales 2,713 1.8 1.0 3.1 ns 2.2 1.5 2.0 1.1 2.0 ns
Renting property 2,713 1.1 1.5 0.5 .05 0.6 0.9 1.5 1.7 0.9 ns
Sold jewellery or currency or 
depleted savings
2,708 5.4 5.8 4.7 ns 1.3 3.0 5.0 5.7 12.0 .01
Housing 2,710
Own residence 2,533 93.5 94.1 92.5 89.3. 91.3 94.5 94.3 98.0
Rented residence 94 3.5 1.6 6.5 6.5 4.8 2.0 2.8 1.3
Dormitory 83 3.1 4.3 1.0 4.2 3.9 3.5 3.0 0.7
Owns land3  1,687 74.5 77.5 71.8
ns
70.5 71.1 76.5 76.8 77.7
.01
Owns durables 
Black & white TV 2,718 18.2 15.6 22.4 .05 23.7 18.9 17.3 17.7 13.3 .01
Colour TV 2,718 85.0 90.4 76.1 .01 70.6 83.5 90.1 88.8 91.9 .01
VCR 2,718 41.1 45.5 33.9 .01 25.4 38.1 44.2 45.4 52.5 .01
Computer 2,718 9.5 13.4 3.0 .01 3.3 6.3 8.5 12.5 16.8 .01
Car 2,718 29.2 28.9 29.6 ns 12.3 25.7 29.8 34.6 43.5 .01
Fridge 2,718 94.4 97.6 89.2 .01 84.6 93.8 97.6 97.6 98.7 .01
Washing machine 2,718 81.8 83.7 78.6 ns 71.7 82.4 86.9 84.6 83.4 .01
Dacha4 1,880 28.6 30.2 14.2 .01 15.5 21.2 31.8 33.2 37.0 .01
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 3 Land owned by 
family. 4 Only urban and semi-urban settlement areas (semi-urban is categorized under rural).
Source: Own calculations RLMS
money on insurance premiums (Table 10).15 These explorations suggest that financial 
markets play only a very limited role in households’ smoothing strategies. One 
explanatory factor for this finding may be that households’ confidence in Russia’s 
financial institutions has not yet been restored, despite the reforms in this sector after the 
1998 banking crisis.16 During this crisis, many households lost their savings as a result of
the bankruptcies.17
If this explanation holds true than it would make sense that households prefer to 
accumulate physical assets by, for instance, buying durables.18 In 2003, expenditures on 
durables were restored to their mid-ninety levels but Mroz et al (April 2004) report that 
such expenditures are mainly made by higher income groups. Table 9 shows that many 
households own durable goods such as a TV, fridge and washing machine but that lower 
wealth households and rural households own fewer durables.19 We have little information 
on whether these assets are sold when other income sources fall short. Using a set of 
questions only asked in the 1998 RLMS survey, Lokshin and Yemtsov (February 2001)
report that only 4% of Russian households reported to have sold belongings in order to 
cope with the impact of the 1998 crisis. The only indicator available is a grouping of 
strategies including that of selling jewellery; about 5% of the household reports to have 
sold jewellery, currency or depleted savings in 2003.20 Especially the wealthiest 
households sold such assets or depleted savings (12%). 
                                                
15 There is no information available on the type of insurance products bought.
16 Although reforms have been taking place since 1998, a series of World Bank and OECD reports from 
2001 and 2002 opines that reforms have been very slow and insufficient (Fuchs, 2002; OECD, 2001a, 
2001b, 2002; World Bank, 2003). Comparison with other countries shows that the Russian banking system 
is small by regional standards and underdeveloped compared to countries with similar per capita income. 
The lack of credit and deposit insurance has the consequence that banks are hesitant to provide credits to a 
wide variety of enterprises while households do not trust banks to manage their savings appropriately. 
17 Using the cross-section of round 8 (1998) of RLMS we find that about 10% of the household reported to 
have lost a large part (on average 82%) of their savings.
18 Guariglia and Kim (2003) and Foley and Pyle (September 2005) analyze household savings in Russia 
incorporating expenditures on durable goods as savings.
19 These durable goods are typically rather old; the average age of a car, fridge, freezer, washing machine is 
above 10 years old.
20 Unfortunately this question includes both physical (jewellery) and financial assets (currency and 
savings).
Physical assets such as a house or land may be used as physical collateral or as a source 
of income (rent). The majority of households own their residence but low wealth 
households are somewhat more likely to rent a residence as opposed to owning it (Table
9). However, even when real estate is privately owned it may be difficult to use a house 
or apartment as financial collateral for a loan; a World Bank study (October 2003) on the 
mortgage and the housing market in Russia reports that there are information problems 
regarding the assessment of the market value of housing and that it is extremely difficult 
to expropriate a house from its defaulting owner. Land ownership, on the other hand, is 
high; three quarters of the households own a piece of land. As we will see below, most 
households use land to produce foodstuffs (including those living in urban areas). 
To sum up, most households own a stock of physical assets and expenditures on durable 
goods have picked up again signalling increased accumulation. However, few households 
report income from the sale or renting of assets and information problems severely 
restrict the selling property or the use of it as physical collateral. The information 
discussed above suggests that there is little evidence that these assets are used as buffer-
stock strategy or as a means to generate (cash) income. It seems that Russian households 
use their stock of assets mainly for consumptive and (home) productive purposes. 
Table 10: Seek insurance – Financial market
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
Insurance payout 2,718 0.2 0.2.05 0 .05 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 ns
Premium paid 2,718 4.6 4.3 5.3 ns 2.0.01 3.1 3.3 5.2 9.6 .01
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households.
Source: Own calculations RLMS
Table 11: Seek insurance – Public authorities (social security)
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
Pensions
Receipt pension, of which 2,718 58.5 57.3 60.5 ns 52.0 55.3 59.5 63.6 62.1 .1
- Old age 1,590 81.7 82.0 81.2 ns 74.9 81.7 80.8 85.3 84.6 .01
- Disability 1,590 17.3 16.4 18.7 ns 24.0 19.3 18.3 13.3 13.1 .01
- Survivor 1,590 5.0 3.9.1 6.8 ns 8.5 3.7 4.3 5.5 3.6 ns
- Military 1,590 4.8 5.7.1 3.4 ns 2.1 3.0 4.6 8.1 5.3 .05
- Social security 1,590 1.1 0.5 2.1 .05 0.4 2.0 1.9 0.6 0.9 ns
- Other 1,590 5.1 5.0 5.3 ns 6.7 3.7 4.4 3.8 7.1 ns
Income share of pensions 1,588 0.5 0.5 0.5 ns 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 .05
Building up pension rights 
Private fund 1,782 16.5 21.4 9.1 .01 12.1 15.6 18.2 19.4 18.5 ns
Federal fund 1,855 97.8 97.7 97.9 ns 98.1 98.8 98.4 99.1 94.1 .05
Unemployment benefits
Receipt benefit 2,718 1.4 1.4 1.5 ns 1.7 1.7 0.9 2.0 0.7 .1
Income share of benefit 38 0.1 0.2 0.1 ns 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 .05
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 
Source: Own calculations RLMS
Table 12: Seek insurance / Seek transfers – Family / Social network 
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
Gives and/or receives gifts 2,717 47.1 50.2 41.9 .05 36.6 39.9 47.3 54.2 57.3
Net giving: 
Giver only 535 41.8 40.2 45.0 23.6 35.9 44.0 47.5 50.5
Net gift giver 95 7.4 7.3 7.7 5.5 6.5 9.3 7.5 7.7
Net gift receiver 123 9.6 10.0 8.8 9.1 9.2 9.3 10.9 9.3
Receiver only 526 41.1 42.5 38.5
ns
61.8 48.4 37.4 34.2 32.5
ns
Given gifts 2,717 28.3 29.5 26.4 ns 14.3 21.0 30.3 36.4 39.8 .01
Income share of gifts given 769 0.24 0.19 0.35 .05 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.31 0.29 .01
Given to: 
Parents 768 15.8 16.5 14.4 ns 7.8 11.4 19.5 14.1 19.5 .01
Children 769 49.9 45.4 58.3 .05 57.7 50.9 50.6 50.5 45.6 ns
Grandparents 767 1.3 1.8 0.4 .1 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.9 ns
Grandchildren 768 31.1 29.4 34.3 ns 28.2 30.7 32.3 36.9 26.2 ns
Other people 768 31.0 35. 23.3 .05 24.4 28.1 30.1 28.3 38.1 .1
Gifts received 2,714 28.0 30.7 23.7 .05 28.3 26.0 27.1 29.2 29.5 ns
Income share of gifts received 761 0.22 0.22 0.22 ns 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.25 ns
Received from: 
Parents 756 47.4 46.0 50.2 ns 49.7 55.0 46.3 46.2 40.5 ns
Children 759 27.3 25.0 32.1 ns 23.4 22.1 26.5 29.8 33.8 ns
Grandparents 757 5.0 5.1 4.9 ns 7.8 3.6 4.1 5.7 3.8 ns
Grandchildren 756 1.7 2.0 1.2 ns 1.3 2.9 2.1 1.3 1.3 ns
Other relatives 758 19.3 20.4 16.9 ns 18.8 22.1 22.5 14.6 18.9 ns
Friends 759 12.5 13.2 11.1 ns 13.0 10.6 12.2 8.2 18.2 .1
Former employer 759 6.9 8.3.1 3.7 .1 5.2 7.8 7.5 6.3 7.6 ns
Social state organs 759 4.6 4.8 4.1 ns 5.8 3.6 3.4 5.1 5.0 ns
Other 759 3.3 4.3 1.2 .05 4.6 2.1 2.0 4.4 3.1 ns
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 
Source: Own calculations RLMS
In their role as a provider (or legislator) of social security programmes, public authorities 
provide insurance against the impact of risks such as (insufficient income at) old age, 
unemployment or disability. The eligibility and benefit levels of such programmes are 
contingent on citizenship and/or contributions history. Social security in Russia means 
first and foremost pensions; 59% of the households receive some kind of pension and, in 
recipient households, pensions make up on average half of total household income (Table
11).21 Receipt of an old age pension22 is most prevalent, followed by a disability pension. 
Interestingly, the incidence of pensions does not differ much across the population, 
except for the lowest wealth quintile; this group of households is less likely to receive an 
old age pension but considerably more likely to receive a disability pension (24% as 
compared to a population average of 17%). The receipt of unemployment benefits and its 
contribution to total income is very low. 
Coverage of the (old age) pension system is very high; nearly every household has adults 
reporting that they are building up (or built up) pension rights at the Federal fund. About 
17% of the households have adult members that are also contributing to a private pension 
fund23. However, these percentages a much lower for households in rural areas and in 
lower wealth quintiles. Thus, the old age pension system in Russia plays an important 
role in terms of benefit incidence (many households benefit), size of benefit (benefit is 
high share of income) and coverage (virtually all citizens are insured). As for the 
adequacy of pensions, the benefit does not guarantee a living standard above the poverty 
line24 but pensioners and households with pensioners are considerably less likely to be 
poor as compared to the rest of the population (MGSoG, 2006). Together, with the results 
discussed in Table 12 and Table 13, we hypothesize that these relatively generous old age 
                                                
21 The share of pension income may be overestimated because other income sources are more likely to be 
underreported (MGSoG, 2006).
22 In Russia, men above the age of 60 are entitled to an old age pension (for women above age 55). In 
addition in certain professions (military, mining) workers can retire at the age of 45 or after had a particular 
length of service (IAAC, October 2006; MGSoG, 2006).
23 Since 1998, workers can also contribute to a Private Fund by means of a notional individual account 
system (Kazianga, 2006). 
24 High risk (old age) pension beneficiaries are single pensioners and pensioners living in large (extended) 
families.
pensions induce a specific inter-generational consumption smoothing channel whereby 
elderly family members assist their offspring.
4.3 Ex post consumption smoothing strategies: transfers, credit and adjustment 
in income generating activities
In times of trouble, households can also rely on their family and (broader) social 
networks such as relatives, friends or others. Depending on the motives and nature of 
such exchanges, they could be labelled as insurance or transfer smoothing mechanisms. 
When arrangements are reciprocal or involve risk-sharing they can be classified as 
insurance. Arrangements based on altruistic motives may be characterized as transfers. 
The RLMS does not provide much insight into the nature of such arrangements but it 
includes a range of variables on gifts received and given by households. We use these 
indicators to explore the existence of such solidarity based networks, including indicators
for the direction of gift giving/receiving and its relative importance (Table 12).25
A first observation is that the exchange of gifts is rather popular in Russia; 47% of the 
households give gifts or receive them. What is very interesting is that households are 
generally either receiving gifts or giving them to others. This observation supports the 
interpretation of gifts as a consumption smoothing mechanism between households.26
Also in favour of this hypothesis is the proportionality in incidence rates of giving / 
receiving as well as in the relative magnitude of the gifts; 28% of the households reported 
giving gifts while 28% reported receiving them. The average value of the given gifts is 
24% of total household income while the income share of a received gift represents on 
average 22%. Thus, at a given point in time, Russian households are either giving or 
receiving considerable gifts on a regular basis. Furthermore, most gifts occur within 
family relations and the direction of flows goes from older generations to younger ones. 
                                                
25 Households were asked to indicate if they have gratuitous received and given money / goods in the past 
month (to / from others that are not part of their household). If yes, the respondent estimated the monetary 
value of the gift. It is not clear what share has been given / received in cash and what in kind. Only for 
home produced food it would be possible to construct an estimate for the value of goods given to others.
26 Alternatively, a high reciprocity of gifts within the cross-section dimension would have pointed at 
another explanation in which gift exchange functions a means build up, maintain or strengthen of family 
relations or social networks.
Additionally, 31% of the gifts are given to other people while 13% of the received gifts 
come from friends and 7% from former employers. The exchange of gifts seems to be a 
relevant and popular smoothing strategy in Russia, especially within families.
There are however some differences between population groups suggesting that not 
everyone is equally likely to make use of this smoothing mechanism. Urban households 
are more likely to be involved in exchanging gifts (both giving and receiving), suggesting 
that this smoothing channel is more important for urban areas. Nevertheless, when rural 
households give, the value of this gift constitutes a higher share of income. Higher wealth 
households give more often gifts but they are equally likely to receive them. But, even 
though lower wealth households give less often gifts, those in the lowest wealth quintile 
are not more likely to receive gifts. Moreover, the income shares of received gifts are 
similar for all subgroups implying that the absolute value of the gift increases with 
wealth. Gifts do not go more often towards those who are (supposedly) more in need. 27
Explanations could be that lower wealth households have fewer social assets which 
prevent them to use family and social networks to smooth consumption, or alternatively, 
the smoothing counterparts of such households themselves have fewer means to assist 
those households (or a combination thereof). 
                                                
27 As discussed in section 0, households in the lowest quintile had average equivalent expenditures around 
the absolute poverty line (average of 2000 - 2003). 
Table 13: Households with old-age pensioners









Number of observations 2,718 1,399 440 270 609
Income
- Receive pension 2,718 20.7 100 100 97.2 .01
- Mean pension share of income 1,588 0.26 0.75 0.75 0.41 .01
- Has wage income 2,713 87.0 12.1 24.8 68.0 .01
- Income share of wage earnings 1,768 0.72 0.49 0.38 0.52 .01
Poor (expenditures) 2,718 12.0 8.2 5.6 14.6 .01
Involved in borrowing or lending 2,708 37.5 13.4 20.4 24.5 .01
Net lender 284 30.3 67.9 67.9 37.1
Net borrower 485 69.4 32.1 32.1 62.9
.01
Has debt 2,712 28.6 5.2 6.3 16.6 .01
Unpaid utility bills 2,707 29.5 7.5 6.7 14.6 .01
Given gifts 2,717 24.2 28.9 48.5 28.6 .01
Given to: Parents 768 31.4 0 2.3 6.9 .01
               Children 769 41.7 52.4 61.8 55.2 .01
               Grandparents 767 2.4 0.8 0 0.6 ns
               Grandchildren 768 13.7 46.8 57.3 33.9 .01
Gifts received 2,714 32.5 30.2 24.5 17.8 .01
Received from: Parents 756 73.8 0 1.5 21.0 .01
                         Children 759 6.0 68.9 74.2 37.4 .01
                         Grandparents 757 6.8 0 0 6.5 .01
                         Grandchildren 756 0 8.4 3.1 0 .05
Net giving: Gift giver only 535 32.5 41.7 60.8 55.5
                   Net gift giver 95 6.3 7.3 11.4 8.0
                   Net gift receiver 123 11.3 6.4 8.2 8.8
                   Gift receiving only 526 49.9 44.5 19.6 27.7
.01
Note: 1 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be different due to missing information in the questionnaire 
and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 2An elderly household member is a person whose age is above the official 
retirement age (55 for women and 60 for men). 3 Wald test on difference means household types (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), 
significant at 10% (.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 
Source: Own calculations RLMS
The discussed results suggest that gift exchange as a means to smooth consumption is a 
promising area for further research. Moreover, the prevalence and direction of inter-
generational gifts combined with the importance of (old age) pensions, yields another 
interesting hypothesis: the relatively generous old age pensions give rise to an inter-
generational risk-sharing in which elderly assist their children and grand children. In 
other words, there a re-redistribution taking place from public authorities via elderly 
citizens to their younger family members. 
We explore the potential relevance of this hypothesis by decomposing the panel in four 
(mutually exclusive) household types; single elderly households (16%), elderly couples 
(10%), other households with elderly members (22.4%) and households with no elderly 
members (51.5%).28 In the first part of Table 13 we can see that pension income forms 
the most important source of income for single pensioners and pensioner couples. These 
groups are also considerably less likely to be poor.29 Other households with elderly 
members form an ‘in between case’ where both pensions as well as wage income form 
important shares of total income. Such households have an above average poverty risk. 
We expect that intergenerational redistribution may occur either by lending and 
borrowing or through gifts. However, the incidence of borrowing/lending activities for 
elderly households is significantly lower than that of non-elderly households. But once 
elderly households are involved, single elderly and elderly couple households are more 
likely to be net lenders.30 Further, elderly households give more often gifts but there are 
large differences between elderly households. Only elderly couples give more often gifts 
than the average population. In terms of receiving gifts, especially elderly couples and 
other elderly households are less likely to get gifts. The results in Table 13 are 
                                                
28 A household member is considered to be elderly once it has reached the legal retirement age; 55 for 
women and 60 for men.
29 We also calculated household poverty rates using household expenditures as a welfare indicator and the 
RLMS household specific poverty lines (2003) as thresholds.
30 In studying household budget data from Latvia, Gassmann (2000) also finds that elderly individuals are 
less likely to borrow or have debt.
Table 14: Seek transfers – Public authorities (social assistance or other benefits)
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
Child benefits
Receipt child benefit 2.718 23.2 18.6 30.7 .01 34.7 31.1 21.0 17.8 11.4 .01
Income share of child benefits 631 0.04 0.03 0.04 ns 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 .01
Housing benefits
Receipt subsidies 2,718 12.2 15.2 7.4 .01 16.0 14.9 11.4 10.3 8.5 .1
Income share of housing 
benefits
332 0.1 0.1 0.1 ns 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 .05
Fuel subsidies
Receipt fuel subsidies 2,716 3.2 2.1 5.2 .05 2.6 3.9 4.2 2.4 3.1 ns
Income share of fuel subsidies 88 0.06 0.05 0.06 0 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.05 ns
Stipend 
Receipt stipend 2,715 5.4 6.2 4.2 .1 6.3 6.6 7.6 3.5 3.1 .05
Income share of stipend 145 0.06 0.06 0.05 ns 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 ns
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 
Source: Own calculations RLMS
Table 15: Adjustment of income generating activities – labour and goods market
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
At least 1 member reports to have 2nd  
and/or 3rd job
1,955 26.2 23.9 30.2 ns 29.9 25.1 24.3 27.1 24.4 ns
At least 1 member has informal job 1,955 24.3 22.4 27.7 ns 30.7 24.6 24.1 24.0 17.8 .01
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 
Source: Own calculations RLMS
Table 16: Seek loans or credit – Household / Financial – Goods – Labour market
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
Involved  
Borrowing and lending 100 3.7 4.3 2.6 1.9 2.4 2.0 4.8 7.4
Only lending 256 9.5 9.8 8.8 4.3 9.1 9.2 9.9 14.8
Only borrowing 429 15.8 15.9 15.8 15.9 16.3 17.0 15.3 14.8
No borrowing nor lending 1,923 71.0 70.0 72.8
ns
78.0 72.2 71.8 70.0 63.1
.01
Net
Net lender 284 36.8 37.4 35.8 22.6 35.1 33.3 37.5 48.5
Net borrower 485 62.9 62.2 64.2
ns
77.4 64.2 66.7 62.5 51.0
.01
Debt 
Has debt 2,712 19.9 19.9 19.8 ns 20.5 20.4 18.6 19.0 20.8 ns
Debt as share of monthly 
expenditures 
526 1.0 1.0 1.0 ns 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.4 ns
Unpaid utility bills 
Unpaid bills 2,707 20.4 21.2 19.0 ns 29.9 18.9 17.9 18.8 16.3 .01
Mean real value 
(in 1992 rubles) 
504 1,889 1,929 1,804 ns 2,817 2,083 1,556 1,131 1,394 .01
Access to loans 
Access to loans from 
employer 
1,621 20.9 24.1.05 15.0 .05 13.7 18.1 20.4 21.9 30.3 .01
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 
Source: Own calculations RLMS
consistent with the hypothesis that some kind of intergenerational risk sharing or income 
pooling takes place, particularly through gift giving. Possibly, such risk-sharing occurs 
either between related households (from elderly single / elderly couple to other non-
elderly households) or within the household (other elderly households). In more profound 
research such hypotheses on the de direction of intergenerational gifts could be tested 
using inter and intra-household decision models.
When income is low, or falls short of what is expected, households can also seek transfers 
from the government. Many countries have a range of benefits that are targeted at low 
income groups (social assistance). Households are eligible for such benefits if they can 
prove their income falls below a certain threshold and / or if their characteristics fall 
within a pre-defined category of eligibility criteria. Alternatively, households may seek 
other benefits that are not specifically targeted at low income households as income 
shocks change the opportunity costs of seeking transfers; when income is suddenly 
reduced, the expected benefit (receiving a transfer) may now outweigh the costs of 
applying for a benefit (time, travel, costs of obtaining required documents) while this was 
not the case before. Table 14 summarizes the incidence rates and income shares of a 
range of benefits; the child and housing benefits are income-tested. The incidence of 
these benefits is considerable and progressive. Child benefits supplement on average 6% 
of the income in the lowest wealth quintile and housing benefits 20%. While urban 
households are more likely to receive housing benefits, rural households receive more 
often child benefits. While these benefits provide an additional source of income, Notten 
and Gassmann (2006) show that the poverty reduction effect of child benefits in terms of 
poverty and chronic poverty is rather low indicating that benefit levels are not adequate in 
this respect. The incidence rates and income shares of fuel subsidies and stipends are low. 
Stipends are somewhat progressive and contribute 8% of household income in the lowest 
wealth quintile. So, even though these benefits may help households to smooth 
consumption, they are typically not sufficient to cover basic needs. 
Instead of, or in addition to, relying on transfers, households can also take up a loan or 
use credit. Table 16 shows that about 20% of the households have been borrowing funds 
and a similar share of the households report to have debt. Even though we do not know if 
funds are borrowed from a financial market or from other institutions, it can also be seen 
that households themselves are active providers of loans; 13% of Russian households 
lend money to others. Thus, even though financial markets may play a role, other 
smoothing channels for credits and loans co-exist in Russia. Household lending activities 
may be one channel but Table 16 identifies two other channels; the goods market and the 
labour market. Not paying bills can be considered as an alternative consumption 
smoothing strategy closely related to (consumer) credit. If late payments on purchased 
goods and services do not automatically lead to a discontinuation of the service provided, 
not paying bills is one strategy that households in need can follow; 20% of the 
households reports to have unpaid utility bills. Moreover, it seems that employers are also 
willing to provide loans to their employees; working household members were asked 
whether they could obtain a loan or credit from their employer. One fifth of Russian 
households have access to such loans.
Taking up credit or a loan seems to be a popular smoothing strategy in Russia. As with 
gift exchange, low wealth households are less likely to provide loans but equally likely to 
receive them. The percentage of low wealth households reporting to have debt and the 
mean share of debt in monthly expenditures does not differ significantly across our 
sample of the Russian population. The information also suggests that, depending on their 
characteristics, households use other smoothing channels. Urban and high wealth 
households are more likely to have access to loans from employers while especially one 
third of the households in the lowest wealth quintile have unpaid utility bills.
Finally, when it becomes clear that current income generating activities will yield 
insufficient income, adjustments in such activities can be made. We have only two 
indicators for such adjustments; the percentage of households in which at least one 
household member reports to have an informal job and similarly for household members 
having a second or third job. We selected these indicators because we expect them to be 
related to situations of unemployment and under-employment.31 A quarter of the 
households reports having household members with an informal job or second/third job.32
While the incidence of informal jobs is significantly higher for low wealth and rural 
households, this appears not to be the case for second/third jobs. Given the prevalence of 
informal and additional jobs, it may be an interesting ally for further research but from 
these results it is not clear to what extent these indicators indeed represent post shock 
smoothing strategies. 
4.4 Income generating activities
Because it is difficult to distinguish between normal income generating activities and post 
shock adjustments in those activities in the RLMS, we finally discuss a number of 
indicators for the type of income generating activities of Russian households. 
Additionally, we are further interested in differences in income generating activities 
between groups of households because such differences may also influence the choice, 
availability and success of particular smoothing strategies. For instance, not having a job 
also implies that one cannot get a loan through your employer but it also restricts the 
possibilities to pursue ex ante smoothing strategies. We selected indicators on wage 
generation, entrepreneurial activities, home production but also indicators for problems in 
the processes of income generation. The latter group is interesting because such problems 
provide insights into (some) sources of income risk and which groups of households are 
more likely to be confronted with such risks. A higher exposure to shocks is likely to be 
associated with a higher incidence of ex post smoothing strategies. Taking a long-term 
                                                
31 Thus, using these variables as indicators for smoothing mechanisms assumes that these income 
generating activities are second best options. Having an informal job implies that such workers are less 
likely to be protected by labour legislation and are also less likely to build up a contributions history in 
public social security programs. This on the one hand, increases the risk of income shocks and at the same 
time also affects the use of alternative consumption smoothing channels (such as a public social security). 
Furthermore, having an extra job reflects a situation where a person would want to work more in his/her 
first job but is not able to, or, the first job pays an inadequate salary. Of course, it is also possible that a 
person has more than one job because he/she prefers to have one.
32 This percentage is based on a question in the individual questionnaire in the work section in which the 
respondent was asked whether his job was (partly) formal. Given the fact that respondents have a tendency 
not to answer such questions or to report that their job is formal even when it is not, the 24% should be 
interpreted as a lower bound.
perspective, an elevated exposure to shocks may also affect consumption smoothing 
abilities in general. 
Table 17 shows that households in the lowest wealth quintile are more likely to have job. 
At the same time, low wealth and rural households clearly experience more problems 
with wage generating activities. Unemployment rates are higher, irrespective of the 
definition used.33 The incidence of irregular wage payments, wage arrears and non-cash 
wages (mainly rural areas) is significantly higher for these households. Working 
members in such households are less concerned about loosing their job but are, at the 
same time, more pessimistic about finding another job when the current job is lost. 
Starting up a business does not seem to be a realistic alternative; and even if it is tried, the 
likelihood that the start up of a business fails is much higher in rural areas and among low 
wealth households. The higher vulnerability of low wealth households to wage shocks 
may be consistent with post shock adjustments in income generating activities such as 
taking additional and informal jobs. However, the reverse may also be the case; wage 
arrears, non-cash and irregular payments are characteristics of informal and additional 
jobs. 
In any case, if wage generating activities are difficult to obtain or if the income from such 
activities is perceived as risky, households could decide to produce (part of their) needs 
themselves or, alternatively, sell those goods in return for cash or other goods. In Russia, 
home production is very popular; 64% of the households that used land to grow their own 
crops, 26% held livestock and 34% fished or gathered foodstuffs such as mushrooms, 
nuts and berries (Table 18). Although rural households are more often engaged in such 
activities, home food production is certainly not limited to households living in rural 
settlement areas; about half of urban households used land to grow their own crops and 
33% of the households reported gathering/fishing activities. The value of home produced 
foods is rather high for rural households (28% of income) but still considerable for urban 
                                                
33 We use two definitions of unemployment; firstly a ‘standard’ definition according to which a person is 
unemployed if he/she wants to find a job and applied for a job in the last month and secondly a ‘self-
defined’ unemployed if the respondent indicates that he/she is unemployed. The latter definition is more 
likely to include discouraged jobseekers or underemployed persons and may thus better reflect structural 
problems in the employability these persons or of (local) labour markets
Table 17: Income generating activities – Wage labour / Entrepreneurial activities
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
Relevance of wage / earnings
At least 1 member has a job 2,718 71.9 73.3 69.7 ns 75.6 73.2 72.7 65.8 72.4 .1
Receipt of wage/earnings3 2,713 65.2 70.8 56.0 .01 62.4 65.0 68.4 61.4 68.6 .1
Income share of wage earnings 1,768 66.0 72.2 53.4 .01 62.1 64.5 66.0 68.2 69.1 ns
Having job but received no wage last 
month 
1,955 8.4 5.8 12.9 .05 11.7 8.5 4.6 7.3 9.7 .01
Entrepreneurial activities
At least 1 entrepreneurial job 1,955 10.2 9.7 11.2 ns 6.8 9.3 9.4 11.5 14.5 .1
Ever tried to start up business? 2,707 17.8 17.6 18.2 ns 13.1 14.2 18.5 19.1 24.2 .01
Start up successful 2,707 40.9 41.6 39.8 ns 18.3 28.6 38.0 49.5 55.7 .01
Start up failure 2,707 67.2 65.5 69.9 ns 84.5 83.1 70.0 58.3 53.4 .01
Problems 
At least 1 unemployed member (standard 
definition)
2,718 7.5 7.3 7.9 ns 12.0 6.4 5.9 7.4 5.9 .05
At least 1 unemployed member (self-
defined)
2,718 15.3 10.2 23.6 .01 27.6 16.2 11.8 12.3 8.5 .01
At least 1 member was not paid 1,955 14.3 11.1 19.8 .05 20.7 15.8 13.2 10.1 10.9 .01
At least 1 member received 
non-cash wage 
1,707 6.9 3.3 14.3 .01 7.7 8.9 7.8 5.6 4.6 ns
Perspectives of working household 
members
Concerned about losing job 1,955 63.0 63.0 63.0 ns 61.1 70.4 67.3 58.9 56.8 .01
Certain about finding job when current 
job is lost
1,955 37.4 45.4 24.5 .01 25.8 34.7 42.3 42.5 42.5 .01
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 3 Reference period 
is a month which can explain why this percentage differs from that of the employment rates.
Source: Own calculations RLMS
Table 18: Income generating activities – Home production 
All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles Test
% of households Obs.2 1 2 3 4 5
Used land past year 2,731 63.7 49.3 87.5 .01 63.9 62.6 68.5 62.0 61.7 ns
Average size of land in Sotkas3 1,673 41 11 67 .1 13 15 20 13 144 ns
Ownership land 1,687
Owned by family 1,257 74.5 77.5 71.8 .01 70.5 71.1 76.5 76.8 77.7 ns
Rented by family 238 14.1 11.3 16.6 .1 18.3 14.5 13.0 12.8 11.9 ns
Part owned, part rented 87 5.2 2.4 7.7 .01 5.3 6.3 5.0 4.9 4.3 ns
Other arrangement 105 6.2 8.8 3.9 ns 5.9 8.1 5.5 5.5 6.1 ns
Home production
Grew crops last year? 1,731 95.7 94.0 97.2 .1 95.7 95.9 97.3 95.3 94.0 ns
Sold crops past year? 1,656 17.5 13.6 20.9 .05 13.0 21.2 16.9 19.6 16.8 .05
Had livestock last year? 2,715 25.6 5.4 58.9 .01 27.0 31.2 29.3 20.6 20.1 .05
Sold livestock past month? 694 8.9 2.2 9.9 .05 6.9 5.9 12.7 8.0 11.9 ns
Sold products from livestock past 
year?
696 43.0 27.5 45.3 ns 38.1 42.6 45.3 46.4 43.1 ns
Gathered mushrooms, nuts, fished
last year?
2,716 34.3 33.3 35.8 ns 33.0 32.2 34.8 33.5 38.0 ns
Sold gathered mushrooms, nuts, 
fished last month?
929 3.0 2.1 4.4 ns 5.0 3.5 1.6 2.2 2.9 ns
Total value of home production 
Total value of gross home 
production (in 1992 rubles)
1,661 1,309 466 2,064 .01 767 1,451 1,460 1,120 1,754 .01
Total value of gross home 
production as share of income
1,661 0.19 0.08 0.28 .01 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.18 .05
Of which: sold (in 1992 rubles) 492 1,588 418 1,974 .01 930 1,580 2,010 1,021 2,377 .01
Of which: consumed or given away 
(in 1992 rubles)
1,661 839 401 1,231 .01 532 897 871 801 1,105 .01
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering effects): not significant (ns), significant at 10% 
(.1), significant at 5% (.05) and significant at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be 
different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample of the households.  3 1 Sotka is 100 
squared meters.
Source: Own calculations RLMS
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households (8% of income).34 Table 18 also shows that most of the proceeds from home 
production are destined to home consumption. 
Interestingly, there are no differences in household food production across wealth 
quintiles; low wealth households do not use this income generating activity more 
frequently than other households, even though they appear to have more problems with 
wage-generating activities. If any, low wealth households are more likely to consume the 
food as opposed to selling it. What explains this popularity of home food production in 
Russia and why do low wealth households not produce more others? A first reason may 
simply be that many households have access to land, either in the place they live or by 
owning a dacha with some land in the rural areas (Table 9). Cultural aspects such as 
preferences on leisure activities may also contribute to explaining the popularity of 
gardening, gathering and fishing activities.35 However, another (perhaps complementary) 
explanation can be that, by producing (part of) their own food, households ensure they 
have some of their basic needs covered even if when their other income generating 
activities fail. Morduch (1995) argues that households can also smooth consumption by 
choosing low risk –low return income activities or by holding a portfolio of income 
generating activities. He calls such activities ‘income smoothing’ behaviour. The 
experience of a multitude of shocks (both covariant and idiosyncratic) that has so far 
characterized the transition process in Russia can be hypothesized as a strong rationale 
for home food production by Russian households.36 Whereas in communist times 
producing your own food provided an insurance against food supply problems it may 
now function as an insurance against (wage) income risk. 
So far, few studies have analyzed the role of household food production in Russia and the 
evidence from those existing studies is ambiguous. Skoufias (2003) finds little evidence 
that home food production is used as a response to wage arrears and unemployment while 
                                                
34 The value of home produced food is also included in the estimate of total household income.
35 Unfortunately not much can be learnt from the RLMS data in this respect. Gassmann (2000) discusses 
how such activities also form an important component of leisure.
36 During the nineties, the Russian population experienced a range of large aggregate shocks that influenced 
their level of well-being but also their perception of risk/uncertainty (Michael Lokshin & Ravallion, 2000; 
World Bank, May 1999).
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Gronau (June 2006) reports a (significant) negative relation between change in labour 
status and the hours spent on gardening. Notten and de Crombrugghe (2006) on the other 
hand find that rural households have higher food consumption smoothing abilities; their 
food expenditures are less responsive to income shocks than those of urban households. 
One way of reconciling these findings would be that food production in Russia is used as 
an income smoothing strategy as opposed to a specific risk/shock response strategy. 
This hypothesis can be tested in a number of ways. Firstly, the RLMS data can be used to 
empirically analyze dynamics between other income sources and 'income' from food 
production.37 Secondly, as home food production may be a typical smoothing strategy in 
transition economies it would be very interesting to study the main conditions under 
which such a smoothing strategy is preferred by economic agents and whether this could 
explain such a high prevalence of this strategy in Russia. For instance, one could think of 
a basic model in which a household has to decide how much time to invest home food 
production versus another (wage) income generating activity. The decision could be 
modelled using a production model or a portfolio investment model. Everything else 
equal, a household will spend more time on home food production in case a) it is more 
risk averse b) the higher the variance of the wage income generating activity and c) the 
lower the (expected) return of the wage income generating activity. Moreover, one could 
introduce an aggregate source of risk that influences the variability of wage earnings but 
not that of home food production. If the aggregate risk is high, it can be predicted that a 
large share of households invest more time in food production. From a dynamic 
perspective, one would expect to see this share decline as the (perceived) aggregate 
source of risk would decline. The RLMS provides a lot of information to empirically test 
the predictions of such models but it would also be interesting to apply those models to 
other (transition) economies. As such this is an area that certainly merits more research.
                                                
37 Information on quantities and the monetary value (valued at local market prices) of home production, 
proceeds from sales are collected in a consistent way during the second wave (1994-currently). For the 
years 1994-1996 even (noisy) information on the hours spent on work/gardening is available.
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5. Further research and concluding remarks
In this paper we developed a conceptual framework representing a portfolio of potential 
consumption smoothing channels and explored empiric evidence of typical smoothing 
channels used by Russian households in 2003. The picture that emerged is one in which 
financial markets play a limited role as a smoothing channel, regardless of the smoothing 
mechanism used (saving, lending, insurance). Instead, households seem to use internal 
strategies, their family, social networks and the state to smooth consumption through 
capital accumulation, gift giving, the provision of loans and (pension) benefits. We also 
find evidence for differential use of smoothing channels of low wealth and rural 
households and other households. Compared to other groups, low wealth and rural 
households are less likely to use financial markets as counterpart for their smoothing 
strategies. Moreover, irrespective of the institutional counterpart, these households are 
less likely to be involved in borrowing and/or lending activities, save money, accumulate 
assets and they also have less often access to loans through employers. 'Consumer credit' 
through not paying utility bills seems to be an important credit smoothing channel for low 
wealth households.
The broad scope of the analysis also enabled the formulation of hypotheses on two a-
typical smoothing channels. Firstly, the relatively generous old age pensions give rise to 
an inter-generational risk-sharing in which elderly assist their children and grand 
children. Important channels for the re-redistribution of old age are the contribution of 
pensions to the income of extended/multiple generation households or the provision of 
gifts to younger family members in other households. Secondly, Russian households in 
rural and urban areas en masse produce themselves part of the food they consume and we 
find no differences in the prevalence of this activity across wealth quintiles. We 
hypothesize that, as opposed to a specific risk/shock response strategy, home food 
production in Russia may be used as an (in kind) income smoothing strategy; it represents 
a strategy that safeguards food consumption in a region where households have 
experienced a high degree of (aggregate) shocks in the recent past. Further investigations 
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into the role of pensions and home food production therefore represent particularly 
interesting alleys of further research. 
Albeit exploratory, this type of research is relevant for academic and policy purposes. 
The way households in transition economies smooth consumption may be different from 
that of households in developed and developing countries. In the economic literature, the 
village economy model is often used to analyze household and individual risk sharing 
activities in rural developing communities but its applicability to a transition economy 
has not been tested. On the other hand, the ongoing structural development of market 
institutions in transition economies may warrant the use of permanent income or life 
cycle type models that are often used to study smoothing behaviour in developed 
economies. These models may not be appropriate or may have to be adjusted so they can 
be used for studying consumption smoothing behaviour in transition economies. The 
conceptual framework and empirical exploratory strategy can be used as tools to obtain 
an inventory of consumption smoothing channels in a given country or community. The 
analysis does not prove the existence of smoothing relationships/channels or whether 
certain actions are ‘smoothing motivated’. Nevertheless, the information it provides, 
indicates which channels are worth further investigating and which linkages have to be 
taken into account (or not).
In terms of policy relevance, our research offers an alternative way to use existing survey 
data to obtain a household perspective on consumption smoothing, with the household 
being the basic institution within which risk and resources are shared. The environment 
of households simultaneously is a cause of uncertainty as well as a counterpart in dealing 
with it. Households use multiple strategies/channels which may or may not be 
country/community specific. The conceptual framework guides thinking about the role, 
scope and type of government interventions and possible feedback effects to other 
smoothing channels. Public authorities can improve or disturb the functioning of 
particular smoothing channels or directly assist households in managing (specific) risks 
by social protection programmes. 
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